

# THE REFORMED THEOLOGICAL REVIEW



## CONTENTS

	Page
KARL BARTH ON MAN IN HIS TIME .. .. .	1
By the Rev. Professor Klaas Runia, Th.D., Reformed Theological College, Geelong, Vic.	
GABRIEL HEBERT ON "FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE CHURCH OF GOD" .. .. .	11
By the Rev. Alan Cole, M.A., M.Th., Ph.D., Kampar, Malaya.	
BOOK REVIEWS .. .. .	21
(See inside back cover.)	

PRICE: THREE SHILLINGS

# THE REFORMED THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

## EDITORS:

THE VERY REV. PRINCIPAL S. BARTON BABBAGE, M.A.  
Ph.D., Th.D., Melbourne.

THE REV. ROBERT SWANTON, M.A., B.D., Melbourne.

## ASSOCIATE EDITORS:

THE REV. JOHN AITKEN, B.A., B.D., Bendigo, Vic.

THE REV. J. A. MUNRO FORD, B.A., B.D., Ph.D., Adelaide.

THE REV. M. W. J. GEURSEN, B.A., B.D., Melbourne.

THE VEN. ARCHDEACON T. C. HAMMOND, M.A., Th.D.,  
Sydney.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JOHN HENDERSON, M.A., Ph.D.,  
Dunedin.

THE REV. PROFESSOR D. S. HOPKIRK, M.A., B.D., B.Litt.,  
Ph.D., Melbourne.

THE REV. D. BROUGHTON KNOX, B.A., B.D., M.Th., D.Phil.,  
Sydney.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JOHN McINTYRE, M.A., B.D., D.Litt.,  
Edinburgh.

THE REV. NEIL MacLEOD, M.A., B.D., Hamilton, Vic.

THE REV. L. L. MORRIS, B.Sc., B.D., M.Th., Ph.D., Melbourne

THE REV. PROFESSOR J. F. PETER, B.A., B.D., Dip.Ed.,  
Brisbane.

---

Contributors enjoy reasonable liberty in  
the exposition of the Christian Faith.  
The Editors are not responsible for  
every opinion that may be expressed.

---

ISSUED THRICE YEARLY

---

Communications and Subscriptions should be forwarded  
to the Editors, The Manse, 304 Glenferrie Road, Hawthorn,  
E.2, Victoria, Australia. Subscribers in New Zealand should  
forward their subscriptions to the Presbyterian Bookroom,  
P.O. Box 389, Dunedin.

Annual Subscription:

Ten Shillings, including postage. (Foreign, 10/6.)



# THE REFORMED THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

Vol. XVII, No. 1

FEBRUARY, 1958

## Karl Barth on Man in His Time

No doubt the sub-paragraph in which Barth in his *Kirchliche Dogmatik* III 2 (his Anthropology) deals with man in his time, is one of the most difficult parts of the whole work. Here in particular we see, what he himself already mentioned in the preface of this volume<sup>1</sup>, that he moves away from the dogmatical tradition, even more than in Vol. II 2, where he dealt with the doctrine of Predestination.

Because of this intricate structure of his treatise, and also of its length<sup>2</sup>, it is not possible to give an extensive rendering of his thoughts. It must suffice to give a survey of the main points and we can only make some cursory marginal notes.

After first having dealt with Jesus as the Lord of time<sup>3</sup> (we will refer to this later on) Barth starts the discussion by pointing out that the time of man is a time which has been given to him by God. However, this is not evident from what we see in the reality around us. On the contrary, what we see, is man in his lost time, a time truly characterised by Hölderlin's "Song of Fate": "... no place at which to rest . . . tossed like water from one reef to another, year in and year out, downward into uncertainty."<sup>4</sup> That is all that can be said of sinful man in his time. Actually sinful man has no time at all. The past is the time which he has had, but now has it no longer. The future is the time which he has not yet had and of which he has no certainty whatsoever as to whether he will ever obtain it. And the present time is even less man's possession, for what is it else than "the step out of the dark into the dark, out of the no more into the not yet"?<sup>5</sup>

1. K.D. III 2 p. VII.

2. Ibid. 524-780.

3. Ibid. 524-616.

4. Ibid. 621. Before Barth this song was already quoted by Karl Heim in his article Time and Eternity ("Zeit und Ewigkeit"), *Zeitschrift für Theol. und Kirche*, 1926, p. 418. Heim in this article describes time as essentially a curse. (The translation of this quotation is taken from the English translation of Otto Weber, *Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics*, 1953. When possible the terminology of this translation by Prof. Arthur C. Cochrane has been used. Otherwise it is an individual translation from the German text.)

5. Ibid. 619.

And so our being in time as sinful men is nothing else than an existence under the wrath of God. It is one great enigma, one great abyss, into which we stare with horror.

Then, however, Barth comes back to the Christology. For in Him, Jesus Christ, we can discover what was the original intention of God for man and his time. In the existence of the man Jesus we see that God has in no way made man in this state of being tossed "from one reef to another."<sup>6</sup> In Him we hear God's protest against our actual being in time. And . . . this protest means God's judgment. But there is more. Jesus' existence in time is not first of all critical, but above all it is an evidence of God's grace. God maintains the nature in which He created man. Thus the existence of the man Jesus in time guarantees us that the time, as the form of human existence, has been willed and created by God, has been given to man by Him, and is therefore real.<sup>7</sup>

Since this Christological light completely changes man's position, Barth then performs a second analysis of man's being in time. In the man Jesus we see that our present, our "Now," is not just a flight out of the dark into the dark, but it is the "Now" God has prepared for us. We do not first exist now, but God first exists now.<sup>8</sup> To exist now means for us: to exist under and with God. And the same applies to our past. Here too we may say: first was God and then He was already our Creator, Saviour and Preserver.<sup>9</sup> Our past is not but lost time, but it is a real and fulfilled time. He loved us in our existence in the past, and because He did not cease to do that, we are still real, also in our past. And finally, also our future is safeguarded.<sup>10</sup> We will be the same, to-day, to-morrow and next year. For in the future also He will be our Creator, Saviour and Preserver, and we will be the beloved ones. Therefore the future is real and we will have real time.

It cannot be denied that there is a great difference between the first and the second analysis, and involuntarily it raises the question: of which man is Barth speaking here? Is it perhaps the man saved by Jesus Christ? Barth himself denies this emphatically. He is not speaking here of the man whom Jesus saved. For this latter man is certainly much more than the natural man, who, as such, is still exposed to the dangers of sin and destruction.<sup>11</sup>

No, Barth is speaking here of the natural man. He is dealing with the Anthropology, the doctrine of the created

6. *Ibid.* 624.

9. *Ibid.* 647f.

7. *Ibid.* 628.

10. *Ibid.* 659f.

8. *Ibid.* 638f.

11. *Ibid.* 670.



man! If anyone should remark that too much is said, he would be forgetful of the fact that this created man can never be thought of apart from Christ. True it is indeed that he is constantly threatened by the dangers of sin, but since God's protest in Christ has sounded, neither ontological godlessness, nor ontological inhumanity is to be ascribed to him, not even with regard to the temporality of his existence.<sup>12</sup> We are not allowed to speak of abstractions. Jesus has died and has arisen again. That means: man has not lost his true nature, in which God created him and in which He still sees him; he really has time and may live in it. It is possible that he himself noetically loses sight of it, by turning away from God and from Jesus Christ; ontically it nevertheless remains the truth about him.

\* \* \* \*

It is evident that the decisive point of Barth's argument is not the first, but the second analysis. The first can fully be accepted as a true picture of the temporal existence of the sinner. Even the second analysis as such can fully be accepted. Indeed this can be said of the existence in time of the man for whom Jesus Christ suffered, died and arose.

But, and this is my objection, Barth does not say this; rather he ascribes this second existence in time to the created man, to the natural man. That Barth does this, is closely connected with and results from the consistently Christological set-up of his dogmatics, and especially of his doctrine of the creation. Again and again he stresses that true theology is impossible apart from Christ. Without Christ the name of God is a mere vocable, without Christ we see only a shadow of man. And so we first of all have to look at the man Jesus, before we are able to deal with man as such.

At the first glance it might seem that Barth, in stressing this Christological approach of the doctrine of man, is only pointing to the noetical relation between Christ and us. He himself even emphatically warns against any identification of Christology and Anthropology<sup>13</sup>, and speaks of orientation of the latter to the former.<sup>14</sup> But in actual fact there is much more at stake. The noetic relation has a strongly ontic foundation. We could say it in this way: Jesus is the principium cognoscendi of Anthropology, because He is the principium essendi. Jesus is the real man. Barth himself says it as follows: "We

---

12. *Ibid.* 670.13. *Ibid.* 54ff.14. *Ibid.* 616.

partake of the human nature, because and while Jesus first partook of it"<sup>15</sup>, and a few pages further we read: "Not He (Jesus) has to partake of the human being, but the human being may partake of Him."<sup>16</sup> Here we are at the centre of Barth's Anthropology. In the relation Christology-Anthropology not only a noetic interest is involved, but it is an ontic fundamental relation.<sup>17</sup>

On the ground of this it is quite understandable that Barth comes to a complete reversal of the historical order as this is given in the Scripture. Not Adam is the original man, but Christ is. "Our human nature is on the ground of his incomparable relation to God first his, then and in view of this: ours. It is original in Him, it is realised as a copy only in us too."<sup>18</sup>

It is clear that the necessary result of this conception is a very definite view on the being of the created man. The latter has to be seen in the light of the man Jesus, and . . . this man Jesus is the revelation of God's love, of God's gracious will. In other words, the being of the created man stands a priori in the beaming light of the divine grace. Barth even goes further and ascribes this to the sinner. For also as a sinner man remains God's creature. Also in his unnaturalness man remains God's covenant-partner. "For God's grace, God's covenant with man is first; man's sin is second."<sup>19</sup> In another place he says

15. Ibid. 58.

16. Ibid. 69.

17. The same principle we find back in Barth's doctrine of the Predestination, K.D. II 2, 101ff. (Cf. p. 110 "Man exists for his sake . . . The being of man is originally his being"), and his doctrine of the Creation, K.D. III 1, 1ff (Cf. p. 29, where Barth himself speaks of the noetic relation and the ontic foundation, and where he applies the latter to Jesus Christ. "Jesus Christ is the Word, by whom we know of the creation, because He is the Word, by whom God accomplished the Creation." It should be noted that according to Barth the Logos of John is always the incarnate Logos! Cf. Also his *Dogmatik im Grundriss*, 1947, p. 66: "The world came into existence, was created and borne by the babe, that was born at Bethlehem, by the man, who died on the cross of Calvary and who arose on the third day.")

18. K.D. III 2, 58. In his special study on "Christus und Adam, nach Romer 5, 1952, Barth has worked this out into further details. Although seemingly Adam is the superscription, written above all human existence, actually Christ is the superscription. Not in Adam, but in Christ we find the primordial image. And so virtually Adam is the Posterius and Christ is the Prius. (Cf. C. G. Berkouwer, *The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth*, 84ff.) In my opinion this whole construction of Barth cannot be maintained in the light of the Scriptures. They point out quite a different way even contrary to the one, indicated by Barth. In Heb. 2:14 we very clearly read: "For as much then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also himself likewise took part of the same," while verse 17 reads: "Wherefore in all things it behoved Him to be made like unto his brethren . . ." Here is nothing of the reversal of the historical order, but the latter is the supposition and the foundation of the whole argument. And the same even applies to the well-known expression of Paul, in Rom. 5:14, where Adam is called: *Typus tou mellontos*. At the first glance this may seem to favour and to corroborate Barth's position, but in actual fact this is not so. In spite of this expression Paul nowhere reverses the order, but he holds this throughout the whole passage. The great point is: "A mighty history is connected with both Adam's and Christ's deed. In this we find the interrelation and conformity, and so is 'a figure of Him that was to come,' scil. of Christ" (G. C. Berkouwer: *Het Werk van Christus*, 1953, 354).

19. K.D. III 2, 36.



that every man "as such is Jesus' fellow man".<sup>20</sup> "Man is together with God, because he is together with Jesus,"<sup>21</sup> and "consequently" godlessness is "the ontological impossibility of human existence"<sup>22</sup> (as surely as it is also, according to Barth, a fact!).

In my opinion Barth here arrives at an objectivism<sup>23</sup> of grace, that finds no warrant in Scripture. It is true, the word "objective" can be used in the right way with regard to the work of salvation. But then it can only mean that this work is certain and definite.

Barth, however, goes much further. With him the word "objective" gets the meaning of a universal, general validity of the work of salvation, apart from and independent of the subjective acceptance by man. It is my conviction that Barth here comes into conflict with the Scripture.<sup>24</sup> The Bible again and again points to the correlation between the work of salvation and faith. Nowhere is man addressed as the one, who objectively is saved by Christ,<sup>25</sup> but man is constantly called upon to believe in Jesus Christ. Or in other words: the Christological notion never becomes automatically a general anthropological truth.

Finally, it is evident that from this point of view the second analysis of man in his time as referring to natural man, is unacceptable for us.

\* \* \* \*

In the foregoing, however, we have seen only one part of Barth's doctrine of man in his time. In the following sub-paragraph Barth adds another aspect. Since God has given time to man, man now has time, and so Barth proceeds to speak of the time of man.

In particular in this part we meet with the difficulty mentioned in the beginning of this article. Very often one

20. Ibid. 159.

21. Ibid. 163

22. Ibid. 162.

23. Barth himself very often uses the word "objective" in this connection. Cf. K.D. I 2, 335, II I, 122.

24. A clear example of this we find in one of Barth's sermons, on the thieves on the cross. Here Barth says: "This was the first Christian congregation, yes the first reliable, unbreakable, indestructible congregation of Christ." They probably had never heard of Jesus before, and certainly had never been believers. But now they could not possibly forsake Him and had to watch with Him on the cross. They could not escape from his dangerous companionship. And in these circumstances they could not renounce Him any more. And so they constituted absolutely and actually a reliable, Christian congregation. "He and they, they and He, were connected—could not and cannot be separated from each other throughout eternity" (In de Waagschaal, 15, June, 1957).

In this practical application we see Barth's theological thoughts very clearly. But also we see their weakness. For Barth is here completely opposed to the text, wherever read of the conversion of one of the thieves only! Our conclusion must be that here the clear testimony of the Scripture is sacrificed to the dogmatical system.

25. Cf. the apostolic speeches in the Acts (Ch. 2, 4 and 5, 7 and 8, 17). Even an appeal to Rom. 5:1-11 is not valid. For here Paul is not speaking of man in general, man-as-such, but of the believers. It is speaking retrospectively from the standpoint of faith.

wonders, whether one has grasped the essential idea of Barth's words and intentions. Yet I think that the main lines are clear enough to understand Barth's thoughts on this point.

The time, which man has, has to be qualified as "befristete Zeit," that means: it is a "set span" of time.<sup>26</sup> Man's time has a beginning and an end, which together constitute the boundaries of his life. Seemingly this is a misfortune. At any rate in man's heart is a desire for duration, because man thinks that only in this way he can fulfil his destination: to be with God and with his neighbour. In actual fact, however, this "set span" of time is salutary for man, because exactly in this fixed span of time we encounter God's free grace. For it means: we are with God in the time. We come from Him and we go to Him. Our lives are not abstractly bounded, but bounded by Him! And He is not a foreign god, but He is the gracious God. And so the limitation of our life and time is not a curse, but we can only say: it is positive good and salutary to be permitted to live in this set span of time.<sup>27</sup>

It is evident of course that there are many important implications involved in this view. Not so much with regard to the first limitation. Barth here just says: we do not come from the chaos, from nothingness, but from the gracious God. It is quite clear that this is no curse, but a rich blessing.<sup>28</sup>

More difficult is the second limitation, that of the end of man's time. For here we encounter death, and Barth himself admits that according to the whole Bible, both the Old and the New Testament, death is a power, which is "quite dangerous to man and quite superior."<sup>29</sup> There is even a connection between death and curse. And so we are here confronted with the difficult question, "whether and in how far" we ever can see this limitation as a destination of man's nature which has been created by God and therefore is good.<sup>30</sup>

There seems to be an insolvable problem here. It is true, here again we do not go to meet nothingness, but God. But . . . between our beginning and our end, between our going out of God and our ultimate confrontation with Him, lies our guilt. Therefore in actual fact death cannot mean anything else than "the sign of God's judgment" upon us.<sup>31</sup> The whole Bible is full of this connection

26. *K.D.* III 2, 671-780. The translation: a "set span" of time is that of Prof. Cochrane, op. cit. 162.

27. *Ibid.* 683.

28. *Ibid.* 695-714.

29. *Ibid.* 718.

30. *Ibid.* 715.

31. *Ibid.* 725.



between death and sin. But nowhere we see it better than in the cross of Calvary. Here we see as large as life, how great and terrible our sin is, and also how great the power and evil of death is.<sup>32</sup> No moralist, no preacher of the law, not even an existentialist as Sartre, can show us the seriousness of our guilt and the danger of our future as clearly as this cross.

But there is more! At this cross of Jesus Christ we simultaneously see also, how gracious God is. We indeed are going to meet God. We certainly have not to fear an abstract death, but God; however, it is the God of Jesus Christ, it is the God, who is for man ("Gott ist für uns").<sup>33</sup> He will not abandon us, He will not drop up into the abyss of death and chaos, but He will hold us in his gracious hand. This is also the reason why Barth time and again refers to death as the sign of God's judgment, and not as the judgment itself. We are not delivered up to a god "Thanatos" but to Him, who in Jesus Christ has changed the judgment into grace.

Therefore all our hope is in Him, and in Him alone. So is it already in the Old Testament. Although there is no clear view of a resurrection or of an eternal life in the Old Testament, yet the believers of this dispensation know that "they, who have lived in their time, as such are before God, who is not a God of the dead, but of the living."<sup>34</sup> And it is still more clear in the New Testament. The leading note of the whole New Testament is: Jesus is the Conqueror. In the name of Jesus the name of Jhwh becomes concrete.

In this connection Barth utterly rejects the idea of a continuation of life after death. According to him there is no place for the thought of "a new beginning, development, and continuation of human life in a time after death."<sup>35</sup> This thought is not only a stranger to the Old Testament, but even the New Testament does not know anything of such an unending future. When all human history will have come to an end, when the last trumpet will have sounded and God will be all in all, then there comes into being "a present without an afterward."<sup>36</sup> That does not mean that we will not be there. We certainly will, but . . . not in an infinitely extended continuation of life. What will happen is this: the life that we have had, in the limitations we have known, will be "eternalised." This is the hope of the New Testament: the eternalising of our ending life, which in this way will be eternally with God.

32. *Ibid.* 732-734.  
35. *Ibid.* 759.

33. *Ibid.* 741.  
36. *Ibid.* 759.

34. *Ibid.* 754.

In the meantime the difficult question, with which we were confronted in the beginning of this second part, is still open: can the end of our life ever be seen as belonging to man's nature created by God and therefore to his good nature? Barth had postulated that to be in limitation is positively good and salutary for man. It is true, as we have seen already, that God conquered death for us, but with that the original character of death as a curse has not been removed.

Barth solves this problem by solving between a twofold death: death as the natural end of life and death as the negation of life. He admits that in the reality of life the two always coincide, but yet we have not the right to identify them. On the contrary, the identity of our end with our death sentence is only a "relative" reality.<sup>37</sup>

Naturally the question here immediately arises: how does Barth prove this? According to him this follows from and is proved by . . . Jesus' death on the cross.<sup>38</sup> It is granted at once that here too death was a sentence, but . . . that of Jesus was substitutionary. For Him this death was a foreign burden. He had not deserved it. It was not a personal sentence, but He carried it for us. Yet at the same time it implies that He could die. If this had not been so, if his being had been an immortal infinite one, He could not have fulfilled his task. And so we have here the case that the end of life and the judgment of God do not necessarily coincide. Furthermore, this case (the case of Him, who has the original nature!) proves that it is quite natural for man to end his life, and so it proves simultaneously that it belongs to man's good nature that his existence is finite, that he is mortal.<sup>39</sup>

It is *luce clarius* that in particular here Barth in many regards deviates from the traditional view. This even applies to his distinction between death as the end of human life and death as a sentence (although the thought that death is a natural phenomenon has been defended more than once before), but especially this holds of his conception of the eternalising of our ending life. Professor Berkouwer remarks here: "This doctrine has, so far as I know, no antecedents in the history of Christian doctrine."<sup>40</sup>

And again we are faced here with the question: does it actually not mean more than a deviation from the theological tradition only? Is there not a deviation from the Scriptures here? It is my deepest conviction that the

37. *Ibid.* 769.

38. *Ibid.* 766f.

39. *Ibid.* 770.

40. G. C. Berkouwer, *The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth*, 158.



latter indeed is the case. I therefore fully agree with Professor H. Vogel, when he says, that it is quite obvious, that Barth's conception of an "eternalisation" is *not* the eschatology of Paul, of the Apocalypse, and of the Gospels.<sup>41</sup> It is indeed a remarkable fact that Barth does not give much Scripture proof here. He particularly appeals to the Old Testament conception of death,<sup>42</sup> which however, is strongly limited by him. For he declares that the Old Testament is a stranger to the idea of a future resurrection. Consequently the passages, which clearly speak of a resurrection, are interpreted in another way. So e.g. Is. 26:19, where we read: "Thy dead men shall live together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust: for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead," is interpreted along the lines of Ezek. 37 as a metaphor on the promised historical regeneration of the people of Israel.<sup>43</sup> And with regard to Daniel 12:2, "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt," it is said that it at any rate is an exception in the Old Testament canon, an exception, which can only confirm the general rule. And so according to Barth the Old Testament believer has but one hope: God, His existence and faithfulness.

But in this way a reduction is applied that violates the full and rich message of the Old Testament. Unbiased examination of the Old Testament gives quite a different picture. It gives the idea of an ever-growing light on the resurrection. It may be true that many of the passages (especially of the psalms) which formerly were adduced as a proof for the resurrection idea, are of ambiguous interpretation, yet it is quite obvious that the elements for this conception are scattered throughout the whole Old Testament, even throughout the earliest books. It is therefore not something essentially new, when at the end of the Old Testament dispensation the message of the resurrection comes clearly to the fore. Afterwards in the New Testament this line is emphatically continued. In the New Testament the full stress is laid upon the future. In that future the Son of man will come back in the clouds of

41. Quoted by K. H. Miskotte, *Schepping en Verbond, Kerk en Theologie*, 11, 4, 199. Cf. also H. Vogel, *Eccc. Homo, Zur Anthropologie Karl Barth's Verkuendigung und Forschung*, 1949/50.

42. Barth follows here the doctoral thesis of his son Chr. Barth (at present Professor of Old Testament at the Christian University of Djakarta, Indonesia): *Die Errettung vom Tode*, 1947.

43. *K.D.* III 2, 753. There is a reference to this collective expectation in the whole passage, but it cannot be denied that there is certainly also mention of the individual resurrection. Cf. the words of the text: "together with my dead body."

heaven, and He will lead his people into the fulfilled Kingdom, the Kingdom of glory, which by the Apostle John is described in the following words: "Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and He will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God Himself shall be with them, and be their God" (Revel. 21:3). Here is no mention of any eternalising. Here is even no room for such a thought. The clear picture is that of a continued existence, consisting of the eternal communion with God. Although it is hard to represent to oneself, how this "new Life" will be, yet it certainly cannot be denied, that it will be a real life. Here on earth we perhaps will never reach beyond the sober words of Prof. H. Bavinck: "The New Jerusalem is a city, built by God Himself; it is the city of the living God, not only because He is the Builder and Maker, but also because He lives in it; in it the angels are the servants and they constitute the retinue of the great King; in it the blessed are the citizens."<sup>44</sup> We will probably never come far beyond this, but at the same time we will never be allowed to say less.

\* \* \* \*

Unfortunately space does not permit me to deal with the other points in this article.<sup>45</sup> It must suffice to say that Barth's appeal to the Christology on behalf of his distinction between death as the natural end and death as a sentence, is very weak. It is no more than a purely dogmatical construction. Also his assertion that death as natural end belongs to the good nature of man, is in conflict with the Scriptures.<sup>46</sup> But once again, we have to leave these things here.

There is only one important question we just want to refer to. It is this: How does Barth come to this conception? All this is so surprisingly new and unusual, that this question involuntarily arises.

In my opinion we have to seek for the background of this whole complex of thought in Barth's doctrine of the Divine Perfections, and that particularly in the doctrine of God's Eternity. Barth has stated there<sup>47</sup> that the eternity of God does not mean timelessness. On the contrary; "God has time, just because and while He has eternity."<sup>48</sup> Further this eternity has to be explained under three

44. H. Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, IV, 701.

45. I may refer here to my thesis: "De theologische tijd bij Karl Barth" (The Theological Time with Karl Barth), 1955, and to Prof. Berkouwer's *The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth*, 1956, which gives a solid and valid criticism of Barth's views in this regard.

46. Barth himself admits that the Bible presents only a "slender line" (op. cit. 772) in support of this view.

47. *K.D.* II I, 685f.

48. *Ibid.* 689.



aspects: God is pretemporal, supratemporal, and posttemporal.<sup>49</sup> Of particular interest here is Barth's exposition of the last aspect. It means: God is, when the time will be no more, because the world and man have come to their end. Then God will be in his rest, after the completion of his work. He will then look back upon everything as upon something that has been in its totality, and as such it will be before Him, just as it should be, accepted or rejected, acquitted or condemned, destined to eternal life or to eternal death.<sup>50</sup>

Here we find repeated the same pattern of thought as we found in K.D. III 2. Barth has remained consistent throughout these years of the growth of his Church Dogmatics. They are a fascinating source of new thoughts, which again and again stimulate new reflection. But the last word will always be the Word of God. Barth himself does not want anything else. And so I think it is in full accordance with his own aim to confront some of his profound thoughts with the light, that has been lighted by God Himself in his Revelation and which remains the only reliable light: a lamp unto the feet and a light unto the path (Pa. 119:105).

KL. RUNIA.

### Gabriel Hebert on

### **"Fundamentalism and the Church of God"**

*Some Observations by a Conservative Evangelical\**

We must gently beg to differ from Fr. Hebert on several points, for, although the title of his book is "Fundamentalism and the Church of God," he says himself "It is with conservative evangelicals in the Church of England and other churches, and with the Inter-Varsity Fellowship of Evangelical Unions, that this book is to be specifically concerned."

Let us begin with two great theses: first, that Conservative Evangelicalism is not Fundamentalism in any of the senses in which Fr. Hebert objects to it: secondly, that Infallibility, which is the typical Evangelical doctrine of the Bible, is a theological and not a mechanical concept. As regards the first, the three reasons for the inacceptability of the term "Fundamentalism" as a description for Conservative Evangelicalism remain its three connotations as stated by John Stott in the "Times" correspondence on

49. Ibid. 698f.

50. Ibid. 710.

\* Portion of Paper read before the Tyndale Fellowship on 14th November, 1957, at Ridley College, Melbourne. The volume considered is published by the S.C.M. Press (London), 1957, pp. 156; 15/- (cloth), 7/6 (paper).

Fundamentalism in August, 1955 — "a bigoted rejection of all Biblical criticism, a mechanical view of inspiration, and an excessively literalist interpretation of Scripture." All these we disown, and from all three we most heartily disassociate ourselves: we see these as a danger to the Church of God as truly as Fr. Hebert does. Now the good Father would not be guilty of setting up a man of straw just for the pleasure of knocking it down unopposed: so we can only assume that he either fails to distinguish between Conservative and Fundamentalist in spite of John Stott's demurrer, or else that he feels that we, in spite of all our well-meaning protests, are tarred with the same brush — else why write a book professedly about Fundamentalism, but deal in detail with known and self-confessed Conservative Evangelicals? But, by definition, in so far as any of these has participated in any of the three criteria of Fundamentalism mentioned above, it is against his own express wish and intention. Be it noted that we do not dare to boast that we are free from these things, but we humbly say that we see the dangers and seek to be free: and these are not the things which make us Evangelicals. If they are there (and we trust they are not) they are accidents, not properties, of the Evangelical.

"Fundamentalism," in the sense in which we both join to condemn it, may be a New World phenomenon; it certainly is not shared by any responsible leaders of Evangelical Conservatism of the Old World. Let us admit at once that it is divisive and "fissiparous," thus leading to countless separatist groups, parties, and churches. More, it is very often associated with the peculiar doctrine of Holiness castigated by Fr. Hebert in Chapter 8 of his book: with his castigation we associate ourselves, although not with his understanding of the doctrine of the Church, manifested in the same chapter. For the present it is however enough that we agree in rejecting this doctrine of Holiness, albeit on different grounds; it might be gently suggested that this doctrine, along with many other aspects of modern Fundamentalism, may be little more than a religious expression of the exuberant spiritual adolescence of the New World that is at once its curse and its charm: it may not be relevant to the present issue, except as an observation of fact. But it seems as if Fr. Hebert's deepest subconscious reaction to Conservative Evangelicalism is a fear lest, whether through this theory of holiness, or through what he regards as a narrow definition of Biblical truth on a propositional basis, schism may be caused within the Church of God, and more particularly within



that branch of which both he and I are members. Yet this is properly speaking not a germane issue, in that it concerns a problem internal to the Church of England, and Conservative Evangelicalism is a phenomenon far wider than any one church, and indeed spans every non-Roman form of Western Christendom. This is natural, in that it is primarily a search for the divine authority, and this is a question universal to Christendom: while, according to the varying views as to the nature and seat of such authority, Evangelicals may well come into collision with different groups in the different traditions.

It would ease Fr. Hebert's mind if he realised that not only are all Western Christians largely "stay-in-ers" and not "come-out-ers" by nature as well as grace, but also the very title that we bear is significant. "Conservative" means nothing unless it denotes that we are those who are loath to make any sudden move to new untested truths, away from the security of well-tried beliefs. To call them shibboleths, and jettison them lightly, seems to us the act of a fool, not the proof of wisdom. We make no new Protestant Orthodoxy for a self-imposed yardstick: we but conserve, and seek to enter into, the beliefs of the past. Even in our attitude to the Bible, we but seek to preserve the reverent approach of the generations that went before: and here it is the Evangelical who is the Catholic. So it is that we make no new formulations of doctrine: we but uphold the traditional Creeds and confessions of Christendom. Because the nature of the Bible, and the relation between the Word of God and the Words of Men was not a subject that engaged the mind of the early centuries, we fall back upon the great Reformation Confessions for formulation of traditional Christian viewpoints by men who were themselves, by definition, conscious of making no change in Christian doctrine, but merely re-discovering and re-stating it.

Our modern anxiety to explain away the religious intolerance of the Reformers, and the religious persecution which so many of them countenanced, may be understandable if seen as an attempt to avoid painting them "warts and all," but is scarcely fair to their theological position. The Lutheran persecution of the Anabaptists, or the English persecution of the Levellers, sprang not only from a horror of their disruptive social teaching, but also through a strong doctrine of the Church. Conservative Evangelicalism sees itself here, as in other places, true child of the Reformation. This is seen, *inter alia*, by our clinging to the "Westminster Confession" of the Presbyterian Church

and the "Thirty-Nine Articles" of the Anglican Church as our formularies: and while Conservative Evangelicalism has ever been inter-denominational, it has never been undenominational or anti-denominational.

Of any of the great early Evangelical movements it is true to say that they primarily encouraged spiritual life in the individual; but they also encouraged his full and hearty participation in the Church life and tradition to which he belonged. Thus the Keswick Convention, for instance, while it instanced in fact that deeper unity in Christ enjoyed by all Christians of whatever tradition, never led to any major rift within any denomination, still less to any transference of loyalty from one denomination to another. The China Inland Mission in early days provided another instance of a Conservative Evangelical group, united at a deep level, tho' superficially divided by different understandings of the Bible and Church History and thus divided as to the best methods of Church Government and Church Worship, continuing to work as a harmonious whole, without any sacrifice of individual conviction. It is unfortunately true nowadays to say that, in the New World, there is a certain general tendency for that which is properly Interdenominational by nature to become Undenominational, if not actively anti-Denominational. In so far as this is true, it stands self-condemned by the premisses of Conservative Evangelicalism: and so long, let us say, as the China Inland Mission has an autonomous Anglican section, functioning both as an integral unit of the local Diocese and yet as a part of an inter-denominational mission, it gives a mute witness against such an arrogation.

Furthermore, lest it be held that these were but views of our fathers to which we Conservative Evangelicals of to-day pay at most a lip-service, be it said that none are more sharply critical of some forms of contemporary New World Fundamentalism than we, and this not merely on the grounds of defective doctrine of the Church, which leads too easily to that "false doctrine, heresy, and schism" from which we pray to be delivered. We also attack it precisely because it seems to us to hold a mechanical concept of Revelation which would obliterate the human personality: because it has a "magical" and "automatic" attitude to Holy Scripture, which seems to us to be a neglect of the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and thus, by default, to leave the door open to the excesses of an extreme Pentecostalism as a reaction. Fundamentalism, in this sense, has no more bitter critic in the United States than



A. W. Tozer, and yet no man more clearly sums-up the views of the American Inter-Varsity Fellowship. To us, Fundamentalism, with its purely intellectualist concept of Faith, is anathema: we see only too clearly that, if Faith be seen purely as intellectual assent, then Antinomianism follows, as surely as night follows day.

An examination of the second element in our self-chosen title would suggest that we are not only Conservatives (and here, in so far as Fr. Hebert is a Conservative, we welcome him warmly) but we are also Evangelicals. We greatly deplore the use of this term as a "party" word: to us, it denotes primarily what its etymology suggests — a man or woman filled with a passionate conviction as to the centrality and the importance of the Good News, and a desire to spread this reconciling message among his fellow-men. That is why Foreign Missions have ever loomed so large in the life of Evangelicals: C. T. Studd and Hudson Taylor are not the exception but the ideal norm: for our peculiar calling is to confront, as God enables us, every man and woman with the offer of God in Christ, and we fear to be turned aside to lesser tasks. That in itself should show that the Evangelical is not by nature a propositionalist. Theological doctrine to him is primarily an experienced fact, a realised eschatology. Initially, he seeks no further formulation for this doctrine than the words of revelation: it is only when simple folk are troubled by new expressions which deep in their heart they feel to be in conflict with the general pattern of revealed Truth, and contrary to their own daily spiritual experience that they blunderingly form "bases of faith."

Now these "bases" are limited, selective, usually simple to the point of theological crudity: but we maintain that they are the lineal descendants of the Creeds, in which the Church sought to meet clause by clause the challenge of heresy as it arose, finding no need to define a view unless and until some heretical misinterpretation made it necessary. So, for instance, the Evangelical insistence upon a "Substitutionary Atonement" did not spring from the belief that this and this only was the interpretation of the Biblical evidence: it sprang from the fact, that, at the time when great stalwarts like Denney and Dale wrote, the very existence of such a strand in the Biblical tradition was denied. This was felt — and rightly felt — by the early Evangelicals to be an aspect of such basic importance that to omit it, or worse, to deny it, was to hamstring the Gospel at whose heart it lay.

Here perhaps we are at the root of the problem: for the Evangelical is a Gospel-man: he sees everything in relation to the Gospel. This in itself is surely a healthy reaction: to him, the vindication of the Gospel is that it is God's saving power: folly to the intellectual, stumbling block to the religious, but an exhibition of divine power and wisdom to the helpless sinner who finds himself, all incredulous, in the midst of the process of salvation. Thus it is true to say that at times the Evangelical appears untheological to the unthinking observer, in that he is not greatly interested in the intellectualist aspects of theology. He may start as an Introvert: for that psychological experience called theologically "Conviction of Sin" is nothing if not introversion. But subsequently he is an Extrovert: his concern is with others, to spread the Good News: and this leaves little time or inclination for detailed self-examination. That in itself is why to the Evangelical much of the climate of mediæval mysticism and ascetic theology has seemed foreign and unhealthy, while with a man like St. Francis of Assissi, he feels himself at once at home. To him, God will be personal and dynamic, and he has no fondness for philosophic formulations of theology that remove Him into a transcendent realm. Here he stands, in a slightly different sense, firmly in the "theologia crucis": he is content to leave a speculative "theologia gloriæ" to the fullness of revelation that is Heaven. His concern is practical, with the preaching of the Gospel entrusted to him.

It will, therefore, be clearly seen — as indeed Fr. Hebert sees it — that the very violence of the Evangelical reaction against Biblical Criticism in the early days was not indicative of an anti-intellectual move as such, but an anti-heretical move. It was not so much a reaction against critical views as such, but against the false spirit from which they sprang, and against the false deductions drawn from them. That this is not a later rationalisation but represented the considered mind of the more scholarly Evangelicals from the very start is to be seen in the writings of Dyson Hague, Orr, and Warfield (the first two of whom are quoted, with at least limited approval by Hebert), while that this is the present Evangelical position could be seen from the writings of F. F. Bruce and a host of others. It may well be true that among simple folk, this reaction virtually took the form of rejection of all forms of Biblical criticism; but if this be seen as the instinctive and self-preservative action of untheological man, it is understandable. There have been many parallels



in Church History, where the Church itself dealt very cavalierly with heretics, through smelling heresy but being unsure wherein exactly the heresy lay. It was because of their attitude to the Bible, either preconceived or resultant, that the Liberal Critics stood self-condemned in Evangelical eyes. Evangelicals, as a rough and ready rule of thumb, have always been ready to accept a man for his attitude to the Bible rather than his beliefs about it. This is a natural outlook for those whose primary interest is practical rather than theological: but at a far deeper level, it corresponds to the fact that, to the Evangelical, knowledge of God is personal and experimental, not propositional and theoretical. What they looked for in men was a reverent attitude to the Bible, and acceptance of its authority, as mediated to their hearts by the Spirit, within the corrective fellowship that is the Church, all of which was the Bible in their experience. Here P. T. Forsyth, the forerunner of Barth, spoke for an inarticulate group as no other had: for while Orr or Warfield may attempt a scholarly apologetic and give a rationale of Evangelical views, Forsyth expresses the Christocentric heart of Evangelicalism as few men have done since Reformation times.

*Mutatis mutandis*, the same broad principle is true to-day among modern Evangelicals: what unites them is a common attitude to, and a common use of the Bible, rather than a detailed system of predetermined and predefined beliefs about its contents and nature. If any of us seems to be an "*anima naturaliter conservativa*," it is because we are so anxious to hold to what is evidently the right attitude, and reluctant to endanger it by wholehearted noisy allegiance to what may prove within a few years to have been but another theory, not a fact. We move slowly, by definition, and we must be sure of our ground before we move. There is too much at stake: we are no longer adolescent, that we should lightly play ball with the Absolute. It is for this same reason that, when we read Fr. Hebert's works on the Bible, we welcome them, as indeed we do many of the productions of the Papal Biblical Institute and various organs of Roman Catholic scholarship: for we see there that same reverent attitude to the Word of God made flesh in the words of men. At such an Incarnation, we may not genuflect, but we recognise our brethren: for here we are no Monophysites, but we are jealous for the Godhead of our Lord. As against the New World Fundamentalist, we are ready to fight for the Manhood, only stipulating that it must be perfect manhood:

as against the rash critic, we must fight for the Godhead of the Word.

This "resultant attitude" is so important to the Evangelical just because he has such a high concept of Biblical authority: were the Bible and the Atonement not the two touchstones of his personal experience of God in Christ, he would not have reacted so violently on either score. This in itself gives him a common frontier with all those who share this experience and accept this authority. This means that Conservative Evangelicalism has ever been a sort of camaraderie between the Churches, and why problems of organic reunion have vexed the Evangelical less than other sections of the Church. To him, different methods of Church government and different usages within worship have meant little compared with that common loyalty: he has never (since the days of English Puritanism at least) attempted to found some new "lowest common denominator" church, because he was convinced that in any one of the Reformed Churches of Western Christendom it was possible to render spiritual worship amid outward forms which neither in matter nor manner conflicted with Biblical principles of worship.

Here, then, is the rub: for here enters the intransigence of Conservative Evangelicalism — not to be dismissed as human pride or mere stubbornness (although God knows such may well be present wherever there are sinful men) but to be seen as part of the same coherent whole as the violent reaction against Biblical Criticism or against what were regarded as weakening and "minimising" theories of the Atonement. To the Evangelical (and again we remind ourselves that here he is true child of the Reformation) not only Faith and Conduct but also Worship, come under the authority of Holy Writ. Thus to use a liturgy or forms or outward signs which seem to be in conflict with the principles of worship deducible from the Bible is for him not only incongruous and misleading, but also a flouting of the very authority under which he professes to stand. Thus enters, in the very midst of what seems an eirenic approach, with Christ seen as the only true ground of unity, what seems at first to be some fresh strain of obstinacy: so that he who just now rejoiced to see the reverent attitude of an Anglo-Catholic brother to the Bible (although perhaps he could not commend all his detailed intellectual views, and might secretly regard some of them as inconsistent with such an attitude of dependent faith) will now admit no kinship or fellowship, in matters of worship.



Yet this is, after all, perfectly logical, for it is not only in their attitude to and use of the Bible that Evangelicals are united: it is also in their preaching of the Gospel. The Gospel is preached by sign and sacrament and liturgy as well as by the word of exhortation: and therefore the Evangelical must have an outward form of service which does not, to him, preach "another Gospel" — otherwise, he would be untrue to the light which he has received. Thus, therefore, the intransigence of the Evangelical (though not we confess, our lovelessness) is a necessary deduction from our theological position: it is precisely because our views on the Bible are such that our views on Worship are such; and this is a grievous stumbling block to our Anglo-Catholic brother. But we remind him that, as in our attitude to the Bible, so in our doctrine of the Church, we have not moved from the position, deliberately and amid great spiritual travail adopted by our forefathers at the Reformation, when they sought to remould the liturgical life of the Western Church in accordance with what they (and we) felt to be primitive simplicity and the scriptural rule. None of the Reformers desired change, or sought change for its own sake: and neither have we, though we have seen many of our brethren turning back again to pre-Reformation practices, either explicitly for no theological reason (which seems untheological sentimentalism) or for what seem to us expressedly mistaken theological reasons, in that they are not Scriptural (which seems disastrous). Here, too, for us the Scriptures are the sole ground of authority.

That leads to the second thesis: that what Evangelicals really hold is Infallibility, not Inerrancy: and that while the first may to some seem to involve the second (although possibly in a "formal" manner) yet the two concepts are not the same. Infallibility is, of the two, the more theological term: we agree that it is negative, and therefore by no means a perfect definition, but it has the merits of being a Reformation term at least, and, if it be negative, it is only negative to exclude views of the Bible that were felt to be heretical, since they conflicted not only with the Bible's own estimate of itself (and the Doctrine of Scripture is to be drawn from Scripture as surely as any other doctrine is) but also with the attitude shown to God's existing revelation by our Lord and the Apostles. "Infallibility" may be predicated of the Bible in that it partakes in the infallibility of God, the Source: we may accept it, in reverent faith, as our infallible guide in faith and conduct. The Bible, rightly read, read as a whole, read

Christocentrically, and read humbly under the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the fellowship of the Church can never deceive us as to what God is like, or as to what man is like, or as to what God's world is like. We do not go to it for a scientific account of the mechanics of the beginning of things, nor for a detached bystander's viewpoint of Israel's history among the nations. Here we would find ourselves in total agreement with most of what Fr. Hebert has said about the nature and meaning of Biblical "truth." We are of one mind: and our sphere of agreement goes even further when Fr. Hebert sees that the historicity of God's saving acts as well as of their interpretation is essential, for if one is the warp of Revelation, then the other is the woof. But when we hear of the assured and agreed results of modern criticism, and hear such lauded, we are not persuaded, and we hold our peace: for, apart from the heretical aspect, much of it seems to us to have been barren and useless. Further, we see no valid theological reason for thanking God that He permitted us to live so long on swinehusks instead of the Father's food, still less do we wish to brag about our sojourn in the Far Country as a personal achievement; we are thankful enough to be back. Since we are primarily interested in attitude rather than beliefs, we are well content that, in this post-critical era, the Church of God is swinging back to a new Biblicism in the quest for authority. Here we may join them: we are too conscious of our own position as fallible sinners to have any room for pride, or to say that there were, all through this troubled generation, those who in the mercy of God, had never lost the Bible, and thus were somewhat bewildered, though gladdened at heart, by all the rejoicing at its rediscovery. This "hidden stream" may have been saved much useless wandering by its distrust of human wisdom in comparison with the divine wisdom: it may have been saved by the very unreflecting nature of its faith, which, as well as being "theologia crucis" is "theologia experientiae." Let us go further: many of its detailed views about the Bible may have even been incorrect: but that its resultant attitude was correct, in humble obedient faith, few would deny. That is perhaps why Evangelical scholars and theologians have been few, but Evangelical missionaries many.

Further, we know only too well that the Parable of the Prodigal Son is also peculiarly the parable of the Elder Brother. We know well that, even in the rags at the swine-troughs, after that one moment of blinding insight, the younger Son was never as far from his Father as the



self-righteous Elder Brother was at the Homecoming: and, as this paper has shown, no group is more acutely aware of the dangers of the evil type of Fundamentalism than we, and no group less desirous of schism and party spirit than we. Is there not then a meeting place for us even on earth? (for true, all differences will be resolved in Heaven when that "theologia gloriae" humbles and rebukes us all). May we not be thus united in attitude to, acceptance of, and use of, God's Word? And may we not be united in Evangelism? And is not this the expression of our ultimate ground of unity in Christ? For, like the Centurion, we are all men "under Authority."

ALAN COLE.

## Book Reviews

### THE IDEA OF REVELATION IN RECENT THOUGHT

By John Baillie (Oxford University Press, London), 1956, pp. 155; 25/- (Aust.).

Of this book it has been said that in it "the fresh start implied in modern theology is brilliantly and authoritatively set forth." I had intended in this review to give an account in my own words of Dr. Baillie's argument; but then I realised that the essential points were summarised far better by Dr. Baillie himself.

We start with the "two-source" theory, of some truths established by reason and others given by revelation; but "what it had to offer us when we had come to the end of our own resources was not something of an entirely different order, but *more of the same*, though derived from an entirely different source" (p. 18). It will not do "to equate divine revelation with a body of information which God has communicated to man" (p. 29); for revelation "is not merely *from* Subject to subject, but also of Subject to subject," and what God reveals to us is Himself, and not merely a body of propositions about Himself (p. 32-3). "The deepest difficulty felt about the equation of revelation with communicated truths is that it offers us something less than personal encounter and personal communion" (p. 39). But revelation includes also redemption; there is in us "not merely something lacking which needs to be supplied, but also something wrong which needs to be put right" (p. 41); what we need is not merely knowledge but "saving" knowledge (p. 46). Hence the Saving Events, which "comprise a 'prologue in heaven, and a 'postlude in heaven'; yet neither prologue nor postlude can be conceived otherwise than as an implicate of the history which lies between them" (p. 57). The Events are interpreted by the Spirit, both in the prophets and apostles who wrote of them, and in us who receive the Gospel by "faith"; and faith means not merely *assent* to truths, nor merely a feeling of *assurance*, but primarily a personal *acceptance*, according to the admirable statement by the Puritan John Flavel (pp. 88-91). Hence the form of the Creed is not "I believe that . . .", but "I believe in . . ."; as F. D. Maurice put it, "That which is believed in is not a certain scheme of divinity, but a Name"—the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit—so that the Creed is evidently an act of allegiance or *affiance*" (p. 104). While then revelation has been given to us in the events of past history, the point is that "*through* the past God reveals Himself to me *in* the present" (p. 105).

"The Bible is the written witness to that intercourse of mind and event which is the essence of revelation" (p.110); but is the inspiration of the Bible to be regarded as having been "plenary," i.e., that "the control exercised by the Holy Spirit was so complete and entire as to over-rule all human fallibility" (p.111)? If it were so, it would be necessary for inerrant Scripture to be provided with an inerrant interpreter, as the Roman Church has done in the person of the Pope; but Protestantism has firmly refused to take this logical step (p.112). We ought not to affirm a "uniform" inspiration of the Scriptures; "we may safely accept Luther's criterion that the revelatory quality of each part of the Bible is to be judged according to the measure in which it 'preaches Christ' (*Christum treibt*); and whatever some have professed in theory, nobody has ever in practice treated all as on the same level in this regard" (p.119).

This is a book to be most warmly commended, and one that ought to be very widely read and studied.

GABRIEL HEBERT, S.S.M.

#### OUR REASONABLE FAITH

By Herman Bavinck. Translated by Henry Zylstra. (Eerdmans, Grand Rapids), 1956, pp. 569; \$6.95.

Since its inception with Abraham Kuyper in 1880 to its present occupancy by G. C. Berkouwer the Chair of Systematic Theology in the Free University of Amsterdam has made a notable contribution to the elucidation of Reformed Orthodoxy in the modern world. Herman Bavinck who held the position from 1902 to 1921 has through his *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek* exercised an influence upon Dutch Calvinism in the first half of the twentieth century comparable to that of Hodge's *Systematic Theology* upon its Anglo-Saxon counterpart in an earlier period. Of the four volumes of this important and influential work only the first to date has been translated into English under the title, *The Doctrine of God* (Eerdmans, 1951, reviewed in our Vol. XI, No. 2, pp. 73-5). Hence this lucid translation of the *Magnalia Dei* (1907) which embodies the author's own compendium of his more elaborate and technical *Dogmatiek* is most welcome. The English title does not designate, therefore, as it might suggest, a work on apologetics.

This synopsis, whilst evidencing the systematic nature of the larger work, with its concatenation of scriptural references and absence of abstract speculation, gives the impression of a succession of inter-related studies in Biblical theology. The writing has a strength yet a freshness about it which anticipates certain aspects of more recent, especially neo-orthodox, discussion, such as the distinction between the *imago Dei* in the narrower and the wider sense, the *imago* as realised not in individual isolation but only in man and woman together, Christ as the subject of election, the emphasis on the covenant of grace in its organic expression, the insistence on the resurrection as involving the whole man in contrast to the mere survival of the spirit. As to the *theologia naturalis* Bavinck is more free of apparant Thomistic nuances than Kuyper and approximates closely to the position of Berkouwer (and Brunner) in affirming the reality of general revelation but rejecting a *theologia naturalis* in the accepted sense. It is only from the person of the Christ of the Scriptures, the mid-point and at the same time the high point of revelation, that traces can be discovered everywhere in nature and history of the true and living God. In the denial of this general revelation Bavinck senses the danger that nature will come to be



regarded as ruled by another power than God and in this way polytheism may again be introduced into human thought. As to the relationship of revelation and Scripture a contradiction would seem to be apparent between the statements that Scripture is "not revelation itself, but the description, the record, from which the revelation may be known" (p. 95) and that it is "a component part of revelation . . . the rounding out and fulfilment, the cornerstone and capstone of revelation" (p. 96). It is, however, the latter rather than the former which represents Bavinck's real position which corresponds to that of his Princeton contemporary, B. B. Warfield, for Scripture, although a human witness, is primarily a Divine testimony to the redemptive acts of God and as such is itself through inspiration one of the redemptive acts of God and therefore revelation. Christologically, the eternal generation of the Son and the creation of the world (especially man as the *imago*) teach that "God is sharable, in an absolute sense within and in a relative sense outside of the Divine being" (p. 324, 5), but they do not already contain the incarnation which is always scripturally related (in the prevailing Western tradition) to redemption. "Jesus was not the first and most important Christian" (p. 227) but embodies the point of bisection of the horizontal line of history by the vertical line which lives in the present out of eternity. "The disciples of Jesus are not, according to His historical name, Jesuites, but according to the name of His office, Christians" (p. 313). In the sphere of pneumatology, Bavinck interprets Pentecost (as Kuyper so vividly does in his *Meditations*) as unique and unrepeatable an event as Bethlehem, so that as the divine and human natures of Jesus Christ are indissolubly united, so now the Holy Spirit permanently dwells in the Church that it is thus given "an independent existence" (p. 390). This would suggest a possessing by the Church that would appear to limit the sovereign independence of the Spirit, for, as G. S. Hendry of Princeton asserts, "it is recognition of the Lordship of the Spirit and the abiding polarity in the relation between the Spirit and the Church that distinguishes Protestant doctrine" (*The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology*, p. 66). Whilst Amsterdam theology, as indicated by L. G. Smedes in his recent critical appraisal, *The Incarnation: Trends in Modern Anglican Thought*, has little affinity with the conception of the Church as the extension of the Incarnation, further consideration requires yet to be given to the relationship of the high ecclesiology of the Kuyper-Bavinck tradition to the basic Calvinistic principle, the monergistic concept, that "redemption, quite as much as creation and providence, is solely the work of God" (p. 269).

On a number of occasions "Cainite" has been mis-spelt "Canaanite" and Mark is wrongly associated with Matthew as giving "detailed accounts of the temptation" (p. 340). The utility of the volume would be enhanced in any further edition by the addition of general and Biblical indices. Popularly intended, yet substantial, this volume, embodying the distilled thought of one of the most discerning theologians of the last generation, provides in its comprehensiveness an excellent survey of the whole field of theology which retains a continuing relevance and value in the discussions of to-day.

R. SWANTON.

#### THE WRATH OF THE LAMB

By Anthony Tyrrell Hanson (S.P.C.K., London), 1957, pp. x, 249; 25/-.

"A sentimental and hedonist generation," said the late Archbishop Temple, "tries to eliminate 'wrath' from its conception of God." This urge to eliminate received quite a fillip in the commentary on Romans

by C. H. Dodd, who, finding "wrath" unacceptable as a personal attribute of God, endowed it with a capital letter and presented it as an absolute term describing "an inevitable process of cause and effect in a moral universe," and used by Paul "in a curiously impersonal way." Dr. Hanson seizes upon this as "the most striking feature" of Paul's conception, and his own work, suggested by a study of the Book of Revelation, is concerned to trace through the Bible that which for him becomes consistently in the New Testament "an impersonal process in history." The first two chapters are given to passages where "the wrath" is found in the Old Testament. Before the Exile the wrath generally appears as the personal reaction of Jahveh to flagrant sin, expressed against Israel in particular. From the Exile onwards, another conception emerges alongside this, in the automatic, impersonal process of sin working itself out in history, its effects now including Gentiles along with faithless Jews. The next chapter, dealing with the inter-Testamental period, holds that these two strands of thought are maintained with some modifications. Of four chapters covering the New Testament, the first and longest is devoted to Paul, and the last to the Apocalypse. There is exhibited, with few minor exceptions, "a consistent conception of the wrath . . . as primarily the consequences of men's sins worked out in history and consummated in the Parousia." A final chapter surveys what scholars have said in recent times and concludes with a brief summary of the author's own position. There are six short appendixes amplifying points of detail, an Index of References and Citations, and a General Index, mostly of proper names.

Dr. Hanson makes comparisons with Hindu thought, and finds strong resemblances to the concepts of *Karma* and *Bhakti*. But he refuses to jettison the concept of the wrath of God, and he seeks to bring it into relation to the Cross. It is questionable, however, whether his insistence that it is "essentially an impersonal process" of moral retribution will be shared save by those who have already expunged a more personal concept from their idea of God. For the Scriptures do not busy themselves with abstract principles and impersonal processes that automatically produce inevitable results. They everywhere proclaim a living, active God who, even as He directs what we call the moral order, reveals Himself unwearingly in personal dealings with men.

C. S. PETRIE.

#### VISIBLE SAINTS — THE CONGREGATIONAL WAY, 1640-1660

By G. G. Nuttall (Basil Blackwell, Oxford), 1957, pp. 178; 41/6 (Aust.).

Friends of modern Congregationalists might be pardoned for failing to recognise them as descendants not only of Regicides but also of some of the most ardent Calvinist scholars in Britain. It is hard to realise that in the mid-seventeenth century Congregationalism dominated the theological and political life of England. Yet on 6th December, 1648, when Colonel Pride marched his men into Westminster Hall and forbade the Presbyterian majority of members of Parliament to sit, men of the Congregational Way became the leaders of both Church and State, scarce fifty years after their founders, Penry, Barrowe and Greenwood, had been hanged, drawn and quartered. And again in the late 19th century, Congregationalism was a dominant force in moulding English patterns of life, and now in the 20th century, after a doctrinal landslide that produced catastrophic results, men of the Congregational Way like Micklem, Whale, Manning and Jenkins have been making a contribution of the greatest value to the Church in England.



What were the bases of this Congregational Way? To this question Dr. Geoffrey Nuttall, lecturer in Church History at the Congregational College in London, gives an answer in his splendid book, *Visible Saints*. As all who know him would expect, it is a monument of brilliantly careful scholarship. His knowledge of 17th century Puritan literature must surely be unrivalled. And it is so well assimilated that a wealth of contemporary literature is woven into the texture of his narrative in a masterly fashion. In his first chapter he gives an historical survey of Congregationalism in the 17th century and to my knowledge this is the first really detailed picture we have. Some counties have been done before, but not the whole of England. Although this chapter is all too short it should make impossible some of the very general and erroneous comments on 17th century Congregationalism that find their way into history books. The succeeding chapters deal with the main principles of Congregationalism. The Principle of Separation. They were "Zealous for a thorough Reformation in separating from the Ignorant, the Vile and the Profane," and "forming themselves into a separate Congregational Church." The Principle of Fellowship. Richard Baxter, a most sympathetic critic, feared that "their churches have among them no probable way of concord; their Building wanteth cement," but as Nuttall urges, this lack of visible cement was made up for by their closely knit fellowship, which worked not only within each small congregation but between the various churches scattered over the country. Local congregations took a very keen interest in the welfare of their neighbours. Why then did they so fear "visible cement"? Strangely enough, this question is never really discussed by Dr. Nuttall, and this "Principle of Independency" is not one of the basic beliefs of the Congregational Man according to his plan. Though surely it was so in the 17th century, judging by the controversy it engendered. The Principle of Freedom. This of course is a basic contribution of English Congregationalism, and the author shows that in the 17th century this did not lead to doctrinal indifference. It was freedom "in Christ" and although latitude was given over things indifferent, this did not prevent them holding their views very strongly. This free attitude was partly due, as Dr. Nuttall points out in a fascinating section, to the emphasis placed on experience. "According to Presbyterian usage, a simple declaration of faith was sufficient for admission to church membership. Congregational usage on the other hand, required of candidates testimony as to the work of grace in their hearts." This difference partly explains the aridity of 18th century English Presbyterianism and the romanticism of early 20th century Congregationalism. The final Principle was that of Fitness—the great emphasis on holiness which could so easily lead to either Pharisaism or Sainthood, and caused a great deal of friction when Congregational ministers who were also parish church ministers (there were at least 120 such during the Interregnum) refused the Sacraments to the non-Congregational parishioners who were not sufficiently holy.

My only criticism of this excellent book is that the author lumps all the Congregational Men together and does not distinguish with enough clarity between the classical Independents who were very dubious about separating Church and State, and the Separatist Congregationalists—the Baptists and Brownists. For, as Baillie remarked, "the Independents take it ill from any man to be called Brownists." As the point at issue concerned the whole relationship of Church and State, it was not trivial.

GEORGE YULE.

**METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS**

By Stephen E. Toulmin, Ronald W. Hepburn and Alasdair MacIntyre (S.C.M. Press, London), 1957, pp. 216; 23/-.

This book makes a real contribution to the current phase of the relation of philosophy and theology. This is the phase in which philosophy as Logical or Linguistic Analysis is sorting out and classifying the variety of forms which human utterance may take and determining the logical status of each. The nature of religious or theological language is the main theme of MacIntyre's essay; though, as he himself says, his concern is not with the logical status of particular theological utterances, but of religious belief as a whole.

The three writers in this symposium are all practised in the art of logical analysis but they all use it with a courteous respect for the types of utterance that they analyse—be they scientific, mythical, poetic, theological. Toulmin's essay (parts of which were written while he was in Melbourne in 1954-5) is that of the historian and philosopher of science. He makes a clear distinction between the scientific statements at the core of such things as evolutionary theory or the theory of the Running-down of the Universe (entropy), and the wider generalised elaborations of them (often made by "scientists" without realising that while mythologising in this way they cease to be scientists) which Toulmin calls scientific myths. Statements of the first order are subject to the verification principle; those of the second are not and therefore are in much the same category as ethical statements—there can be no final arbitration between opposed scientific myths of this sort by an appeal to facts for there are no observable facts that are relevant to the issues as thus stated. This essay is clear-minded, just and broad and, to this reviewer, entirely convincing.

The second essay—that by Hepburn of Aberdeen—is the most tentative of the three, raising far more questions than it answers and feeling its way through the more rarified atmosphere in which the literary critic lives. It is an attempt to understand the theology of images and particularly to relate the complex web of imagery that gives its deep unity to the Bible to the nature of poetry. He works out in a very exciting way just how far we can get and where we run into real trouble if we assume an analogy between the religious type or image and the poetic image. Is the poet's "insight and imagination" the same as the prophet's "inspiration"? His conclusion: The Analogy is fruitful but dangerous when rashly invoked. Ideas which analysis has shown to be meaningless don't revive (like flowers do in water) just by calling them "poetic." Yet the theologian need not despair if his expressions violate the ordinary use of language—for such deviations are the staple of poetic inventiveness.

Alasdair MacIntyre's essay balances Toulmin's in weightiness—making of the book a sandwich with the meat on both sides and bread in the middle. He writes as a thoroughly trained logical analyst who has also a firm grasp of contemporary existential theology. His analysis of the status of religious belief is an admirable appreciation of what it means to be a Christian believer. Because it involves the whole man—is more like the state of a madman or a lover (using Kierkegaard's phrase)—its essence is worship and action. To equate metaphysics with religion is to eviscerate religion. "Belief cannot argue with unbelief; it can only preach to it." To scepticism, "belief can only recount the content of its faith and offer the

acceptance of its authority." Its voice is a confessional voice. This essay will be the centre of considerable discussion in the future, one feels, both by the theologian and the philosopher—which, of course, is the purpose of the Library of Philosophy and Theology of which this book now forms a valuable unit.

J. C. ALEXANDER.

#### PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT

By John Murray (Tyndale Press, London), 1957, pp. 272; 15/-.

In March, 1955, Professor Murray delivered the Payton Lectures at Fuller Theological Seminary. These lectures have been expanded to provide the volume under review. There are ten chapters dealing, *inter alia*, with such important questions as marriage, labour, capital punishment, truth, law and grace. As one would naturally expect from Murray, the attention of the reader is directed to the teaching of the Scriptures as the supreme authority in the whole sphere of Christian conduct. He does not claim to cover the entire field of biblical ethics, but in his selection of aspects he has manifested discernment worthy of commendation.

His treatment of the problem of labour is a corrective to the perverted and nebulous type of thinking that is only too common at the present time. Murray clearly shows the danger that is inherent in a political philosophy based on humanism and alien to the biblical economy. He warns against the "mastery of labour" and the "tyranny of labour" (p. 105). The practice of slavery in biblical times is discussed in an interesting way. However, one must confess disappointment that something has not been said about present-day problems. What about the attitude of the Christian to trade unionism? How should the white race regard those of another colour? In a chapter dealing with the teaching of our Lord, an excellent and concise exposition of part of the Sermon on the Mount is given. The fallacy of the view that Christ contradicts the teaching of Moses is exposed, while the true interpretation is convincingly set forth. The concluding chapter appropriately bears the title "The Fear of God." The necessity of this kind of fear in the heart and life of the people of God is emphasised, while it is also stressed that ethical integrity must be grounded in and be the fruit of such fear.

This volume would not be out of place among works on Biblical Theology and as such it provides a valuable basis for the study of Christian Ethics. Not everyone will agree with Murray's exegesis of certain passages of Scripture, but we are indebted to him for such a work of merit. This volume can be wholeheartedly commended to all who are earnestly seeking to regulate their manner of life according to the will of God. It should be of special interest to teachers, students and study groups.

ALEXANDER BARKLEY.

#### SHORTER NOTICES

*The Text of the Old Testament*, by E. Wuerthwein (Blackwell, n.p.). Introductions to the Old Testament for students can be dull and unattractive. This one is not. Wuerthwein provides a succinct survey of the forms of early writing, and of the problems of the Hebrew Masora, and then outlines the development of the manuscripts and even of the printed editions of the Bible. The Septuagint and the Targums are fully treated, along with the other versions, and the student is introduced to the whole problem of textual criticism. It is interesting to find the Dead Sea Scrolls taking their natural



and rightful place amongst those documents which help us to interpret the text of the Hebrew Bible. The second half of the book comprises illustrations in the form of excellent photographs of specimens of the manuscripts discussed. The whole is meant to be an introduction to the latest edition of Kittel's *Biblia Hebraica*, and to that end all the abbreviations used in the latter are clearly expounded and related in the margin of Wuerthwein's text to the relevant material in his book. This study will obviously become an invaluable textbook for the classroom.

*The Servant of God*, by W. Zimmerli and J. Jeremias (S.C.M., 10/6). One of the most important books of the century is what we call for short Kittel's "Woerterbuch." Begun twenty years ago a good third of it has still to be written. In its several large volumes the leading German-speaking Biblical scholars have given us definitive studies of the great theological words of the Greek New Testament. To do so, however, they have had to trace the roots of those words in the Old Testament, and have also had to discover what other usages these words had in classical Greek and in Talmudic Hebrew translation. Some of the more important studies have already been translated into English by J. R. Coates, and published under the general title of *Bible Key Words*. Now the S.C.M. Press has produced a translation by Harold Knight and others of the original article *Pais Theou*, "The Servant of God," from the pens of W. Zimmerli and J. Jeremias. This study is a delight to read. It is thorough, scholarly, and comprehensive. No other biblical image reveals more clearly the significance of the call of Israel, the meaning of the Suffering Servant, and the work of Christ. This booklet alone puts the series "Studies in Biblical Theology" in the front rank for making the fruits of present-day biblical scholarship available to a wide public.

G. A. F. Knight.

*Muhammad at Medina*, by W. Montgomery Watt (O.U.P., 68/- Aust.). Following the delineation of the persecuted preacher in *Muhammad at Mecca*, this sequel portrays the reforming ruler of Medina. The writer regards the whole of Muhammad's work as the building on a religious foundation of a political, social and economic system. The conception of the *Pax Islamica* is a security system embracing all the Arab tribes with its consequent hardening attitude to the "religions of the book" (Judaism and Christianity) and the introduction of virilocal polygny into the loose matrilineal society of Arabia (described as "an important advance in social organisation" (277), constitute the principal themes. In view of its prevailing religious atomism, Islam is, however, paradoxically defined as "a community of individuals or band of brothers, joined together by common duties, but in the last resort not necessary to one another" (309). Whilst Muhammad is defended against charges of insincerity, sensuality and treachery, he is appraised as a remarkable combination of seer, statesman and administrator. Although Dr. Watt's estimate of the character of Muhammad is higher than that of most Western Orientalists, he seeks objectivity and in this total work, marked by great erudition, the student will find a valuable "history of the life of Muhammad and of the origin of the Islamic community" (v).

*Is there a Conflict between Genesis I and Natural Science?* By N. H. Ridderbos, and *Evangelical Responsibility in Contemporary Theology*, by Carl F. H. Henry (Eerdmans, \$1.50 each). The first book, which following its Dutch original would be more aptly entitled

"Observations on Genesis I," adopts the framework hypothesis, first propounded by Philo, and is considerably indebted to the recent work of A. Noordtzi. The story of creation is regarded as being set in a literary framework in which, the chronological yielding to the topological order, the six days represent two triduumms (each containing four works) which reveal a marked parallelism. In expressing the judgment that it was not the intention of the sacred writer "to present an exact report of what happened at creation" (45) the author would appear to make some approximation to the view that here is *Geschichte* but not *Historie*. Not the least interesting aspect of the valuable discussion is the recurring criticism of the Christological exegesis of Barth. In the second volume the writer considers the fortunes of Protestantism in our era. Whilst disowning Liberalism as a perverse revision he is yet critical of Fundamentalism in its "neglect of the inter-relations of theology, of the bearing of the Christian revelation upon culture and social life and of the broader outlines of the doctrine of the Church" (36), as a discredited reduction of Christianity. Yet, despite serious strictures, the latter represented "biblical supernaturalism in conflict with theological unbelief" (48) and in the marked swing to theological conservatism to-day a basic Fundamentalist thesis has been vindicated in the recognition that Biblical Christianity implies an indispensable core of doctrine. Concerning the contemporary restoration, however, Dr. Henry is critical of the rejection by Neo-orthodoxy of revelation as involving propositional truth as an unfortunate inheritance from Schleiermacher, and he concludes that both as to its consequences for Christian doctrine and *Weltanschauung*, "Evangelical theology's best hope for a relevant and aggressive impact for our turbulent times lies in a bold, biblical emphasis on the relationship of revelation and reason" (66). Presenting a lucid analysis of the contemporary situation this provocative little book with its insights makes a substantial contribution to current discussion. The series of "Pathway Books" will be further enhanced by the addition of these two volumes.

*Responsible Protestantism*, by Cecil de Boer (Eerdmans \$3.50). This series of essays, endeavours to express the Reformed perspective on such subjects as society, state, education, science, labour, race and peace. Written from an American background it embodies a serious grappling with the role of the Christian in the contemporary situation. The writer, who trenchantly criticises the bureaucratic welfare state as but a step to the totalitarian, is of the opinion that the basis of ownership should be widened under the free enterprise system to the point where actual responsibility is really possible for the majority. Among many pertinent observations it is noted that contrasted with the Christian exaltation of the teaching office "it is in pagan and primitive religion that doctrine is at a minimum and where instead of a creed we find a ritual" (155).

*Words and Images*, by E. L. Mascall (Longmans Green, London, 15/6 Aust.). Against contemporary linguistic empiricism which asserts that perception is identical with sensation, the writer maintains that perception is primarily an intellectual act in that "the intellect uses the sensible phenomenon as an *objectum quo*, through which it passes to the apprehension of the *objectum quod* which is the intelligible trans-sensible being" (70). It is only by such penetration that the real existence of objects and persons, including God, can be discovered and explored. As a Thomist Dr. Mascall's methodology is that of the *analogia entis*. However, while theology like other spheres of epistemology, widely uses concepts, it has a special function for

images, which, following A. M. Farrer are regarded as "the means that God has chosen in order to reveal his own thoughts to men" (122). Here real Christian insights supplement the basic concepts of Aristotle, the prophet of the natural man.

*The Sacrament of Reconciliation*, by Thomas M. Donn (The Leslie Press, 11 Old Bond Street, London, W.1, 7/6). This book, in seeking to elucidate the Reformed doctrine of the Lord's Supper, rejects both sacramentalism and sacramentarianism. However, whilst registering "some measure of sympathy" with the Quaker position, it is upon the former, especially in the sacrifice of the altar, that the criticism mainly turns. After considerable exegetical and other discussion, Mr. Donn concludes that the main reason for the misunderstanding of the sacrament is that "the Lord's death has been interpreted exclusively in terms of the forgiveness of sins and without reference to its reconciling purpose" (55). The author clearly indicates that his sympathies lie with the subjective influence theory of the atonement rather than the objective views. Although many will consider the basic position here as quite inadequate, the book contains many valuable insights and necessary emphases, such as the forthright assertion of "the essential nature of preaching as an integral part of the correct observance of the sacrament" (72).

*Profile of John Calvin and the Institutes*, by Harold Whitney (W. R. Smith & Paterson, Brisbane, 20/-). This presents a short evaluation of the character, work and influence of the Reformer, followed by a clear and concise summary of the *Institutes*, and concludes with the chapter on Paedobaptism from that work as an appendix. From the informed mind of a Queensland evangelist of wide experience this book provides a useful introduction to its important subject.

*Rembrandt and the Gospel*, by W. A. Visser't Hooft (S.C.M., 25/-). The theme of this volume is that in his early career Rembrandt came largely under the influence of contemporary baroque art, but from 1642 onwards in the tragedies of his own life "he no longer sought to exploit the Bible; he tried to interpret it" (19). The transition from the dominance of the *zeitgeist* to the style of a "painting of the cross" is effectively portrayed in an excellent series of plates. Dr. Visser't Hooft discounts any definite Mennonite influence on the work of Rembrandt whose associations, though weakened through the irregularities of his later life, were with the National Church. But his art is too personal to be classified in any system. This is an informative and live study of "the only great painter not only of the Netherlands but also the whole world to deserve the name of a Biblical painter, for he roams through the Bible from beginning to end, and gives us what he discovers" (22).

*Introducing New Testament Theology*, by A. M. Hunter (S.C.M., 10/6). This little book consists of three sections: The Fact of Christ; the First Preachers of the Fact; the Interpreters of the Fact. "In the Synoptic Gospels the Kingdom of God forms the central theme. In Acts the apostles preach now Christ, now the Kingdom (cf. Acts 8:5, 12). Paul talks of preaching Christ, never of preaching the Kingdom" (64). Yet this process concerns a change not in the content but only in the terminology of the Gospel for, whilst in the Synoptics the Kingdom was Christ in a mystery, with the apostles, after the Resurrection, Christ was the open disclosure of the Kingdom. More correctly an introduction to New Testament Christology than Theology here is a useful companion to the author's popular *Introducing the New Testament*.



*The Reformed Pastor*, by Richard Baxter, and *Selected Letters*, by Samuel Rutherford (S.C.M., 8/6 each). These classical writings concerning the cure of souls, with considerable omission of repetitional and controversial matter, have been abridged by the editor, Dr. Hugh Martin, with the guiding aim of presenting "what might be of interest and practically helpful to present-day readers." A glossary is provided for Rutherford and a modernising of the spelling with Baxter. These belong to the valuable series, "A Treasury of Christian Books," in which some of the great tested devotional and pastoral writings are being published in modern dress.

*Promise and Fulfilment*, by W. G. Kümmel. Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 23 (S.C.M., 12/6). This is the translation of the third edition of *Verheissung und Erfüllung* (Zwingli Verlag, Zürich, 1956) the second edition of which was reviewed in our Vol. xiv, pp. 28, 29.

*Christianity and Idealism*, by Cornelius Van Til (The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., Philadelphia, \$1.80). The unifying theme of this collection of articles and reviews is that although the language of idealism resembles that of Christianity its thought terminates in the relativism of pragmatism. Dr. Van Til, adopting as his basic pre-supposition the conception that God is "the complete and original interpreter of the universe" (71), incisively analyses the philosophic tradition which in various modern forms regards the definitory mind of man as "the ultimate autonomous interpreter instead of as derivative interpreter" (80). Although these papers, which were written between 1930 and 1942, are largely related to writers of the period of idealistic dominance, their trenchant criticism by a thorough theocentricist of the conceding of ultimacy to finite personality remains relevant and necessary.

*Counselling and Theology*, by William E. Hulme (Muhlenberg Press, Philadelphia, \$3.75). The aim of this book is "to correlate the data of the psychology of clinical research with our theological heritage for pastoral counselling" (18). The basic problem of human personality is regarded as guilt which the doctrine of justification meets "at its grass roots." "So theology has something vital to say when pastoral counselling faces its fundamental challenge" (156). Written out of wide knowledge and experience, this book will provide considerable assistance in the pastoral office.

R. Swanton.



# Book Reviews

	Page
BAILLIE, JOHN: The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought By the Rev. A. G. Hebert, M.A., D.D., S.S.M., St. Michael's House, Crafers, South Australia.	21
BAVINCK, HERMAN: Our Reasonable Faith .. .. . By the Rev. Robert Swanton, M.A., B.D., Melbourne.	22
HANSON, ANTHONY TYRRELL: The Wrath of the Lamb .. By the Rev. C. S. Petrie, B.A., B.D., Stawell, Victoria.	23
NUTTAL, G. G.: Visible Saints — The Congregational Way .. By the Rev. Professor George Yule, M.A., Ormond College, University of Melbourne.	24
McINTYRE, ALASDAIR (ed.): Metaphysical Beliefs .. .. . By the Rev. J. C. Alexander, M.A., B.D., Vice-Master, Ormond College, University of Melbourne.	26
MURRAY, JOHN: Principles of Conduct .. .. . By the Rev. Principal Alexander Barkley, B.A., Reformed Theological College, Geelong, Victoria.	27
SHORTER NOTICES .. .. .	27



APR 7 - 1958